Abstract: This paper analyses the reasons behind the long-term underperformance of China's stock market. We argue that the price growth of local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is hindered by the control of state shares by local cadres, who often sell the shares below market prices during their time in office. Our empirical analysis reveals that political turnover of prefectural Party Secretary has a significantly negative impact on the selling of state-owned shares and the price growth of local state-owned enterprises, while there is no such impact on private enterprises and state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government.
Introduction
From the time since its establishment in the 1990s, the Chinese stock market remained stagnant from 2000 to 2013, and has been consistently failing to achieve its expected growth. Figure 1 Huang et al. (2008) test for structural change in the Chinese stock-price level caused by the nontradable share (NTS) reform. Using the net-of-market-trend stockprice series, it is shown that the NTS reform drives stock prices up in more than twothirds of the cases.However, this proved to be an isolated event because the growth was only temporary. Using a multivariate cointegration and vector error correction model, Liang and Willettt (2015) show that economic factors have a long-term equilibrium relationship with stock market performance in China. After the Chinese stock market crashed in 2007, stock variations became more responsive to changes of economic fundamentals suggesting that there had been a bubble. Overall, the growth rate of China's stock market still significantly lags behind the country's average 10% economic growth rate, even after including the stock market's sharp rise in the first half of 2015.
Since the stock exchange was established, the Chinese government has practiced a "quota system", which only allows state-recommended companies to be listed. As a result, listed companies are mostly SOEs. In 1999, the quota system was replaced by the approval system, which allows companies to go public upon fulfilling a number of conditions, thus increasing the percentage of non-state-owned listed companies. By the end of 2012, SOEs held by local governments (local SOEs) accounted for about 26% of the total stock market by market value, and SOEs held by the central government (central SOEs) accounted for as much as 48%. The average stock price of local SOEs rose by only about 20%, far below that of the central SOEs and the privately owned companies, which rose by about 31% and about 75% respectively.
The underperformance of local SOEs is therefore a prominent cause of the sluggishness in the stock market.
We argue that the ambiguity with regard to the property rights of SOEs, and the agency problem in SOEs, are major causes of staggered stock price growth. Central The central government only allows state shares to be traded through private agreements, rather than through public offerings. This private and non-transparent trading mechanism leaves room for local cadres, mainly a city's Mayor and Party Secretary, to sell state shares at low prices for personal gain. Buying firms are often owned by local officials, or by other closely connected individuals. There are two ways to sell state shares: 1) by introducing new shareholders or 2) by having the parent company divest state shares, which is more common. As the performance of local SOEs is not directly linked to the professional interests of local cadres, 2 they have a high incentive to sell state shares at low prices for private benefits before they leave office, 3 which is a major obstacle to the price growth of local SOEs.
In addition, such under-the-table transactions may be known by the public, which might decrease trade volumes on the stock exchange, and indirectly affect the market price of the stocks. Previous studies (Miller, 1977; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen, Hong and Stein, 2002; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Cochrane, 2003; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Mei et al., 2009) analyse the connection between trading volumes and stock prices from the perspective of optimistic investors' speculative motives. Our paper contributes to the literature by revealing that political turnover might also influence prices through reducing the trade volumes.
We use the turnover frequency of prefectural Party Secretaries and prefectural The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the background of this study. Section 3 presents the model and the estimation results.
Section 4 concludes the paper.
Background
2 Oi and Rozelle (2000) and Kung, Cai and Sun (2009) argue that the behaviours of local cadres are determined mainly by two factors: career incentive and revenue incentive. The former incentive might curb the selling of state shares, while the latter might stimulate officials to sell state shares for personal benefits before their departure. See also Shih, Adolph and Liu (2012) , Opper and Brehm (2007) and Jia, Kudamatsu and Seim (2013) . 3 Reasons for leaving office includes being transferred, promoted or demoted. There are three levels of local SOEs, namely the provincial, prefectural and county levels. Table 2 shows the political turnover of Prefectural Party Secretaries, reduction of shares of the majority shareholders, and price growth. Note that from 
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Empirical analysis
Reduction of shares held by majority shareholders
In this subsection, we analyse the cross-sectional differences in the reduction of shares owned by a sample of 2662 listed companies from the CSMAR Database and "10jqka" Financial Service Net.
The listed company is defined as a local SOE if its majority shareholder is a local SASAC, a municipal department, or a school. If the majority shareholder is the central SASAC, the listed company is defined as a central SOE. The listed company is defined as privately held if a family, an individual or a foreign investment entity directly controls the firm. 
Dependent Variable
Key Independent Variable
We let 
Controls
Other explanatory variables include the initial number of shares owned by the majority shareholders in year 2003, denoted by " initial ", and two dummy variables for local SOEs and central SOEs, denoted as SOE and COE , respectively. We also include firm-level variables (as defined in Table 3 ) that might affect both the trade volumes and the performance of listed companies, such as their size, debt-paying ability, anti-risk ability and growth ability. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables. To study what affects the percentage reduction of shares held by the majority shareholder, we estimate the following model: Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Effects of reduction of shares held by majority shareholders
To investigate the impact of a reduction in shares held by the majority shareholders on stock prices, we estimate the following model: Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 6 . First, for private enterprises, the reduction in shares held by majority shareholders does not have a significantly negative impact on stock prices. Second, the negative impact of the reduction in shares held by majority shareholders in local and central SOEs is significant.
Political Turnover and Stock Price
There are several reasons why the effects of the reduction in shares held by the majority shareholder in local and central SOEs are negative. First, due to the nonpublic and non-transparent mechanism of state share trading, the negotiated selling Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. Furthermore, provincial level leaders are more hesitant to sell state shares, as the opportunity cost of corruption is too high for them. Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
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Another Measurements of Price Change
To examine whether the results are robust after the change of the dependent variable, we redefine The results are reported in Table 9 . Overall, we find minute variations with Table 7 . Notes: 1）The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations; 2）* * * 、* * and *, respectively, represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels.
Conclusion
Previous studies on the stock market of China employ GDP or other macroeconomic variables to explain the ups and downs of the market. Such an approach is somewhat problematic because the stock market of China does not grow proportionally to its GDP. This puzzling phenomenon has not yet been fully explained in the literature. This paper analyses the long-term underperformance of China's stock market through highlighting the effect of the principal-agent problem in China's bureaucratic system, and argues that the sluggishness of the Chinese stock market is due to the underperformance of SOEs. As Fama and French (1992) postulate, small firms tend to outperform large firms, which helps explain why private firms outperform SOEs in China. However, firm size effect cannot completely account for our results, as the percentage increase of the prices of large central SOEs is not the lowest in our findings.
We argue that the slow growth of the stock prices of SOEs can be attributed to the reduction in shares held by majority shareholders, as outgoing local cadres possess incentives to sell state shares at a lower price during their tenure for private benefits.
We conclude that the ambiguity of SOE ownership, the network-dominated promotion scheme of Chinese officials, and the illiquidity of state-owned shares are the major reasons for the long-term sluggish performance of the Chinese stock market. To boost the stock market, the Chinese government should promote transparency in the transaction of state shares. In addition, local officials in control of the SOEs should be
